STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: A TREASURY EXPERIENCE by Kipokola, Jonas P.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: A TREASURY EXPERIENCE
Jonas P. Kipokola*
I INTRODUCTION
Most sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs) have,
for up to a decade, been implementing Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of one form or an-
other, to revive their economies and put them on a
sustainable footing. For most of these countries the
SAPs are now collaborative arrangements with the
Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank - IBRD and
the International Monetary Fund - IMF), other inter-
national financial institutions and bilateral donors.
The SAPs are strictly speaking a phenomenon of the
1980s and 1990s. It is also noteworthy that invariably
the SAPs have been coordinated at the Treasury,
partly because these programmes have also been
strategies for mobilizing the requisite external re-
sources for implementing the SAPs and partly be-
cause of their emphasis on macro fiscal, monetary
and exchange rate issues.
After a decade or more of learning by doing,
Treasuries, Planning Ministries and Central Banks of
SAP countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have
accumulated valuable experience in Programme
design and implementation. It is important that
this experience should be pooled and shared to
improve the effectiveness of SAPs in SSACs more
generally. The IDS (Dar es Salaam/Sussex) semi-
nars, by deploying SAP practitioners as resource
persons and participants are an instrument to
this end as well as a functioning example of a
North-South partnership.
With regard to Tanzania, economic management
through SAPs is a phenomenon beginning in the
mid-i 980s. The Economic Recovery Programme(ERP-I) which was launched in July 1986 as a
three-year economic management framework
(1986/87-1989/90) after prior negotiations begin-
fling in late 1984 turned out tobe an effective strategy,
in that an appropriate package of policies and actions
was able to trigger external resources to support
its implementation and that it enabled the
feeble recovery of 1984-85 to gather momentum
for the next six years.
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During the early 1980s, efforts by the Government of
Tanzania to arrest the deterioration of the economy
had been unsuccessful. The 1980 Standby Arrange-
ment with the IMF was suspended after only one
quarterly drawing, for failure to satisfy the perform-
ance tests. The 1981 National Economic Survival
Programme (NESP) was a crisis approach to foreign
exchange scarcity, and although export receipts in-
creased during that year, the recovery was not
sustained in 1982. The Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP), also planned for three years
(1982/83-1984/85) and the product of high-owned
external professional cum technical inputs, failed to
attract complementary external resources as well as
being less than enthusiastically received by domestic
professionals and decision takers. By 1983-84 the
view that sustained adjustment without substantial
external support was impossible and therefore that a
programme for negotiation with the Fund and Bank
needed to be agreed domestically had achieved the
broad professional personnel and decision taker
support it had not enjoyed when first put forward
by the Treasury in 1981.
ERP-I was initiated and drawn up by the Govern-
ment of Tanzania in late 1983-early 1984 as a
medium term plan and strategy for reviving the
economy. The initial draft was discussedextensively
through workshops and seminars, involving partici-
pation from the Government sector, the parastatl
and private sectors, and academic institutions. This
discussion was directed to three objectives: (i) brain-
storming - to improve the draft, (ii) informing and
to educating as to realities and options; (iii) enlisting
broad based internal support for the programme.
Following the internal discussions, the IMF was
approached in late 1984 to evaluate the programme
and render support. Fortunately, the Fund was
responsive. Equally important the Bank agreed to
develop initial programming and to hold a pledging
conference exercise prior to (though contingent on)
conclusion and implementation of a Fund agreement
in order to reduce the lag between initial shocks and
resource inflows. Acceptance by the IMF of the need
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to associate growth with adjustment following
conclusions of the Annual Meetings of the World
Bank and IMF in Seoul, South Korea in Sep-
tember, 1985 probably played a crucial role in
sustaining GOT - IMF SAP collaboration under
ERP-I, ERP-II (ESAP) and post-ESAP. Tanzania
always held very strong views on the need for
low income countries to be assisted to adjust with
growth, not with a substantial initial contraction only
subsequently reversed by renewal of growth.
2 THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SAPS IN SSACS
SAPs in SSACs may be generalized to represent
belated macroeconomic management responses to
situations of excessive policy and structural distor-
tions built up over a number of years and especially
from 1979 onward. The causal factors for the
economic deterioration vary from country to
country, but in all cases both internal and external
factors have been at play. In the case of Tanzania,
the Arusha Declaration (1967) which shifted empha-
sis to public ownership of property, increased role
of government and government intervention in eco-
nomic activity is an important background for the
SAPs in the 1980s. External factors, like the oil
shocks (1973-4 and 1979-80), droughts (1973/74,
1979/84) the break-up of the East African
Community (1977), the 1978 coffee price collapse
and the war following the Uganda invasion
(1978-79) were important. In particular lack of any
adequate and timely macro-economic policy
responses over 1978-1979 and major domestic
disagreements on policy over 1981-1984 were
crucially important.
Consequently, the situation for Tanzania prior to
SAPs, which is typical for SSACs, was one of eco-
nomic and financial crisis. Real GDP growth was
negative for three consecutive years (1981-1983) and
rose at less than population growth in 1984 and
1985. The output of agricultural crops fell or stag-
nated, or was perceived to do so, while crop export
volumes decreased sharply. Industrial capacity
utilization declined from 60-70 per cent in the
late 1970s to a dismal 20-25 percent by 1985 while
absolute industrial output declined sharply, falling
to less than 5 per cent of GDP in 1985, down from
12 per cent in 1978. Domestic inflation accelerated
to over 30 per cent in 1984 compared to 12
per cent in 1977-79; the overall budget deficit
increased rapidly to over 16 per cent of GDP in
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1981/82 though it was squeezed back to about
10 per cent in 1984/85. Side by side with - and
via inflation contributing to - a marked decline in
real wages, recourse to domestic bank credit
was financing about 75 per cent of the budget
deficit 1983/84. Official reserves had beenexhausted,
external payments arrears had accumulated to
US$ 900m. in 1986 compared to US$ 500m. in 1983
and negligible in 1978. Medium and long term
debt had escalated from US$ 2.8bn. in 1983 to
US$ 3.8bn. in 1985, despite which imports had been
severely curtailed, declining by 40 per cent in real
terms between 1980 and 1983. Economic infrastruc-
ture, including lorry fleet and railway rolling
stock, had deteriorated badly due to lack of main-
tenance and replacement. The quantity and quality
of social services, in which the Government had
invested heavily in the post-independence
period, had also deteriorated due to budgetary
underfunding. An acute shortage of consumer goods
and production inputs in the first half of the 1980s,
peaking in 1983, was a visible manifestation of the
economic crisis prevailing in Tanzania in the period
immediately before the SAPs.
3 POLICY RESPONSE AND ECONOMIC
STRATEGY
ERP-I was launched in July 1986 as a three year
economic management strategy in collaboration
with the IMF, World Bank, other international
financial institutions and bilateral donors. The
ERP entailed macro and sectoral measures,
with detailed action plans and monitorable per-
formance criteria. Key policy areas included the
exchange rate, trade liberalization, interest rates,
producer prices, the budget, credit creation and
money supply growth.
In ERP-I (1986/7-1988/9) efforts were directed
mainly to the productive sectors and economic
infrastructure, while in ERP-II or ESAP (1989/90-
1991/2) emphasis was shifted to the social sectors,
especially education and health, and financial sector
reform; followed by public sector reform (Parastatal
and Civil Service). After ERP-II, a Rolling Plan and
Forward Budget (RPFB) have been introduced,
starting in 1993/94, to take the place of the PFP
(Policy Framework Paper) and the Annual Plan.
Like the PFP, the RPFB has a three year frame-
work which is rolled forward every year, and
because it combines the PFF and the Annual Plan,
it has been possible to have in one document
(i) macroeconomic policies (ii) sectoral policies,
and (iii) the investment programme.
4 PERFORMANCE RESULTS
The key economic indicators have stayed
encouraging throughout the SAP period (ERP-IM
ERP-II and after). Real GDP growth has averaged
about 4 per cent compared to 1 per cent for 1980-85;
the rate for agriculture is 4.5 per cent against
0.6 per cent for 1980-85 (admittedly during a run
of good weather years); while industry's is 5.1 per
cent compared to minus 4.5 per cent per annum
for the period 1980-85. Performance improvements
have been constrained by institutional and structural
bottlenecks, such as marketing arrangements,
transportation and processing capacity. These are
very important long term issues for sustainable
growth and the Government has been addressing
them. Inflationary pressures have been abated
(from more than 30 per cent in 1986 to about 20 per
cent) and future prospects look good due to
financial sector reforms and more targeting of
policies and strategies. The fiscal imbalance has
also been substantially corrected, albeit more by a
substitution of external grants for domestic bank
borrowing than by raising domestic revenues
relative to expenditure. Extensive structural and
institutional reforms have been achieved in agricul-
ture, the financial sector, domestic and foreign
trade regimes, and foreign exchange management.
Substantial improvements - rehabilitations - have
been achieved in transportation and social
infrastructure. Individual initiatives and the role of
market forces have been vigorously revived;
while the excessive size of the public directly
productive sector has been programmed for
substantial reduction as part of economic restruc-
turing. The problem of consumer goods and
production inputs availability has been substan-
tially abated under Tanzania's SAPs. This result
relates partly to trade liberalization but more
basically to donor provision of funding for
open general license (OGL) imports.
The balance of payments position has,
however, remained precarious, and external
sector performance has on the whole been
unsatisfactory despite concerted efforts. Similarly,
the external debt problem has not been
tackled durably inspite of (or perhaps because of)
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repeated Paris Club reschedulings and occasional
debt write-offs by bilateral creditors.
5 SOME LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM
TREASURY EXPERIENCE (WITH REFERENCE
TO TANZANIA)
In respect to appropriateness of approach: it seems
the ERP-I and ESAP have been suitable strategies
for structural adjustment in Tanzania. Under the
ERP-I, ESAP, PFPs, SAFs, ESAF and policy-
based lending by the World Bank Group, it has been
possible to address policy reform and structural
adjustment issues simultaneously while safe-
guarding the growth objective.
Uses of broad based consensus and a home-grown
programme are rather evident in the Tanzania case.
The fact that Tanzania has been a country committed
to a transition to socialism (albeit not to a Marxist-
Leninist state) and that both economic adjustment,
and reversion to multi party (as contrasted to single
party) competitive elections, started before the
changes in Eastern Europe, meant that the Govern-
ment had to proceed cautiously by building toward
a broad-based consensus. In this regard the ERP
approach which involved adequate prior prepara-
tion and broad participation was very helpful. The
same caution had to apply in negotiations with the
IMF first to roll over/redraw and - with ESAF - to
increase drawings as well as to secure a 'seal of
approval', and for policy-based lending by the World
Bank Group. In this respect, the creation of an
interministerial technical group of officials for the
purpose, coordinated by the Treasury, proved effec-
tive, in so far as intra-governmental unity is con-
cerned. It also helped ensure that the tensions result-
ing from broad agreement on strategy but substantial
divergences of perspective on specific policies as well
as on sequencing and timing did not lead to deadluck
and/or to programme collapse.
The importance of timely action (costs of initial
delays) is clear from the Tanzanian case. Delays
in undertaking appropriate adjustment policies
exacerbate the underlying economic weakness,
thereby entailing larger doses of action in future
adjustment policies. In turn, this makes decisions to
adjust more difficult and the adjustment measures
when they get taken more painful. For Tanzania,
opportunities for corrective action were missed or
postponed until a crisis situation developed. But by
the same logic from mid-1984 when Tanzania
adopted most of the measures for a SAP, the lag
in external response weakened initial results and
by mid 1985 endangered continuity of policy.
Prioritization in a situation of limited resources re-
quires concentration of effort on those of greatest
and most rapidly visible recovery impact. For
Tanzania the productive sectors of agriculture
and industry, together with transportation were
assigned phase one priority, relatively effectively
for agriculture but with serious unexpected lags in
the case of industry.
Real cum financial sectors adjustment are not
opposites. Where both sectors have been distorted
and are inefficient, as has been the case for Tanzania,
it seems adjustment in both sectors should be under-
taken simultaneously. In Tanzania we sequenced
real sectors before financial sector reforms, and
this has proved costly especially in terms of
inability to control credit creation, money supply
growth and inflation. Arguably, however, the un-
derlying monetary problem is both real and
political, not purely monetary or technical. No
Tanzanian government has been willing to allow
a situation in which no buyer had credit to
purchase peasant crops and the efficiency/bad
debt record of both the public (Marketing Authority)
and main private (Co-op) sectors since 1976
has - despite massive foreign advice and policy
design inputs - been disastrous.
Pace of adjustment is, in practice, a barrier to
sustain-ability. Structural adjustment is slow, and
requires patience and sustenance of efforts. This is
particularly so because for countries like Tanzania, in
addition to adjusting economic and institutional
systems, there may also be a need to create new
ones. However, difficult changes each year are
sustainable only if gains from past changes are
evident, not least is the run up to elections in
1994 (local government) and 1995 (national).
Choice of policy instruments is an area of consider-
able ambivalence. We think that IMF programmes
overload the exchange rate as a policy instrument.
Whereas it is true the exchange rate is an important
policy instrument for restoring external sector bal-
ance, it is also true that it cannot work if important
cooperative factors do not exist. In the case of
Tanzania, the assessment is that these other factors
issues have not been adequately recognized and
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considered by the Brefton Woods institutions. The
same is true of the interest rate structure. Highly
negative real interest rates do lead to credit allocation
problems but very high positive real interest rates
crowd out long term productive investment.
The feasibility of performance benchmarks, as
now designed, in an economy subject to massive
weather and terms of trade shocks is open to
doubt. While performance tests are desirable and
indeed necessary for monitoring programme imple-
mentation progress, the experience has been that
some targets have been set which were clearly
unachievable right from the start and others were
attainable only on favourable weather, terms of
trade and aid flow timing assumptions. In the
case of Tanzania, this has been particularly true for
credit ceilings, and money supply growth targets.
One factor here has been an inadequate understand-
ing of the dynamics of institutional reforms in low
income economies e.g. prompter Treasury payment
of bills raises the cash flow fiscal deficit in that
year and is recorded as a worsening of fiscal perform-
ance. Other targets failed to take into consideration
weather (not simply bad weather - good weather
increases the amount of credit needed to buy crops)
and terms of trade vagary.
The role of the state and private sector has become
an area of pendulum swings which may or may
not be corrections toward an equilibrium. Because
many sub-Saharan African countries have over-
extended public enterprise sectors, privatization and
divestment are bound to be a necessary part of struc-
tural adjustment programmes. Nevertheless, there
are many pertinent issues regarding the extend to
which privatization and divestment should be taken,
and the roles and State should continue playing in
the business enterprise sector. If the private sector
is as underdeveloped as it is in Tanzania, it seems
there is a need to recognize a fairly extended role
of the State in enterprise development, especially in
the short to medium term. Premature sales of
shares or enterprises leading to near monopolization
of purchases to foreign enterprises plus minority
citizen communities will lead to a backlash threaten-
ing both investment stability and - even more
important - the liberal, non-racial character of
Tanzania.
Market forces and trade liberalization is an issue
which requires serious discussion, because as part
of adjustment programmes the Bretton Woods
institutions have been pushing external trade
liberalization measures without adequate consid-
eration of the existence in the adjusting countries of
conditions for fair competition or of the need to
project local (infant) industries. Indeed they have
chosen to ignore that domestic market protection
parallel to industrialization has characterized almost
all successful manufactured export break-throughs
(as well, it is true, as the industrial sectors which
failed to achieve efficiency).
6 CONCLUSIONS
A lot has been learnt in the process of SAPs in SSA:
1 consensus building has to be part and parcel of
designing structural adjustment programmes;
2 For adjustment to work, timely decisions and
decisive actions are crucial;
3 Serious local technical capacity is necessary if a
country is to work with and benefit adequately
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